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INTRODUCTION 
Marcus was poor, he was African American, and he seemed to 
suffer from mental health issues.1 One day, he walked into a major 
 
 *  © 2019 William O. Walker. 
 1. “Marcus” is the fictitious name of a real client the author helped represent during 
a summer internship at a North Carolina public defender’s office. Other minor details are 
altered to protect the client’s identity. This account is taken from his arrest warrant and his 
client intake interview. 
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retailer and decided to put several packs of playing cards into his 
backpack. After placing the merchandise in his bag, Marcus headed 
for the door. Just as he stepped into the parking lot, however, he was 
stopped by one of the store’s security officers. During an interview, 
Marcus told me that as soon as the officer confronted him about 
taking the cards, he admitted to the act and handed over the 
merchandise. Still, the security officer called the police and kept 
Marcus on the premises until they arrived. Marcus was arrested, 
jailed, unable to post any bail, and indicted on one count of habitual 
misdemeanor larceny. The indictment charged him with stealing 
fourteen packs of cards valued at $60, though Marcus maintained that 
it was only four packs. 
Assuming the indictment was accurate, Marcus committed the 
larceny of $60 in playing cards. Normally, this crime would qualify as 
misdemeanor larceny, a penalty carrying a maximum, but unlikely, 
sentence of 120 days incarceration.2 In Marcus’s case, however, the 
act of stealing several packs of game cards was charged as a Class H 
felony because Marcus had four prior convictions or guilty pleas for 
misdemeanor larceny. Therefore, his latest offense brought him under 
North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute.3 
 
 2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	14-72(a), 15A-1340.23(c)(2) (2017). A resolution to Marcus’s 
case was put on hold as he underwent a mental health screening. Ordinarily, it would have 
been unlikely for Marcus’s case to proceed to trial and result in the maximum punishment 
of a Class H felony. Instead, a plea deal to a misdemeanor would be the typical result. As 
will be discussed below, even at trial, judges can impose relatively light felony sentences, 
but they cannot remove the felon designation if the jury returns a guilty verdict on a 
habitual misdemeanor larceny count. See infra Part III. 
 3. See id. §	14-72(a)–(b)(6). The pertinent part of the statute reads as follows: 
(a) Larceny of goods of the value of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) is a 
Class H felony. .	.	. Larceny as provided in subsection (b) of this section is a Class 
H felony. .	.	. 
(b) The crime of larceny is a felony, without regard to the value of the property in 
question, if the larceny is any of the following: 
.	.	. 
(6) Committed after the defendant has been convicted in this State or in 
another jurisdiction for any offense of larceny under this section, or any 
offense deemed or punishable as larceny under this section, or of any 
substantially similar offense in any other jurisdiction, regardless of whether 
the prior convictions were misdemeanors, felonies, or a combination 
thereof, at least four times. A conviction shall not be included in the four 
prior convictions required under this subdivision unless the defendant was 
represented by counsel or waived counsel at first appearance or otherwise 
prior to trial or plea. If a person is convicted of more than one offense of 
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In North Carolina, it is a Class H felony to commit larceny where 
the property in question is not more than $1000 and the defendant 
has four prior larceny convictions.4 Without the previous convictions, 
larceny of property totaling not more than $1000 would otherwise be 
a Class 1 misdemeanor with a worst-case punishment of 120 days 
incarceration.5 A Class H felony, on the other hand, carries a 
potential active sentence of thirty-three months and lifetime branding 
as a “felon.”6 In Marcus’s case, because of his prior larceny 
convictions, stealing $60 worth of playing cards could result in the 
severe Class H felony punishment. 
Increasing criminal penalties for recidivists is not a novel 
concept. Blackstone noted it was a “heavy misdemeanor” to defend 
the Pope’s power within England; the second time, however, it was 
“high treason.”7 The American colonies utilized some early forms of 
recidivist statutes. For example, the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
punished repeat burglars more seriously than first-time offenders, and 
the colony of Virginia punished “repeat hog stealers” more harshly 
than neophytes.8 The use of recidivist statutes continued after the 
 
misdemeanor larceny in a single session of district court, or in a single 
week of superior court or of a court in another jurisdiction, only one of the 
convictions may be used as a prior conviction under this subdivision; 
except that convictions based upon offenses which occurred in separate 
counties shall each count as a separate prior conviction under this 
subdivision. 
Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. §§	14-72(a), 15A-1340.23(c)(2). 
 6. Id. §	15A-1340.17(c)–(d). This sentence length assumes the highest prior 
conviction record and aggravating factors and is determined by using the chart included 
within the statute. First, enter the chart on the left at felony level H. Id. §	15A-1340.17(c). 
Next, move to the right until reaching the appropriate “Prior Record Level” column. Id. 
Within that box are three ranges: mitigated (the lowest), presumptive (middle), and 
aggravated (highest). Id. The aggravated range for a Class H felony with the highest prior 
record level is 20–25. Id. Next, take the highest number in that range, 25, and move to the 
“Minimum and Maximum Sentences” chart that follows the main sentencing chart. Id. 
§	15A-1340.17(d). Locate 25 in the chart labeled “For Offenses Class F Through I” and 
read the available range (25–39). Id. Without aggravating factors, but still with the highest 
prior record level, the maximum active sentence allowed is 20–33 months. Id. A 
presumptive range with a prior record level of III could still include a sentence of 10–21 
months. Id. 
 7. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *87. Blackstone also states in his 
introduction that the worst punishments “ought never to be inflicted, but when the 
offender appears incorrigible: which may be collected .	.	. from a repetition of minuter 
offences.” Id. at *12 (emphasis added). 
 8. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Double Jeopardy as a Limit on 
Punishment, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 52–53 (2011). 
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Constitutional Convention, but it was not until the early twentieth 
century that such statutes became commonplace.9 
North Carolina has habitual statutes for misdemeanor assault,10 
driving while intoxicated (“DWI”),11 and, since 2012, misdemeanor 
larceny.12 All of these provisions use a defendant’s prior misdemeanor 
record to significantly increase the level of punishment prosecutors 
may seek and, most devastatingly, impose felon status upon 
defendants. As the historical tradition suggests, North Carolina is not 
alone in its use of recidivist statutes.13 In fact, all fifty states and the 
federal government have enacted some type of recidivist provision.14 
Notably, North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute uses 
prior larceny offenses—misdemeanor or felony—as the only factor 
needed to apply felony sanctions.15 
Though recidivism statutes come with a historical pedigree, they 
also come with costs that demand an objective examination of their 
benefits and worth. Arguably, this demand is even greater for 
misdemeanors, where the harms and threats to society are less 
significant than for felonies.16 This is especially true with 
misdemeanor larceny in North Carolina, where the value of the 
property taken is not more than $1000.17 
This Comment examines North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor 
larceny statute. After comparing the costs of creating more felons and 
giving longer prison sentences with the supposed benefits of increased 
punishments for those who habitually steal $1000 or less in property, 
it concludes that the benefits do not justify the costs. North Carolina’s 
 
 9. Id. at 53; see also Michael G. Turner et al., “Three Strikes and You’re Out” 
Legislation: A National Assessment, 59 FED. PROB. 16, 17 (1995) (noting that several states 
in the 1920s became enthusiastic about the prospect of harsh sentences targeted at 
habitual felons). 
 10. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-33.2 (2017). 
 11. Id. §	20-138.5. 
 12. Id. §	14-72(b)(6). 
 13. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §	11.46.130(a)(6) (LEXIS through 2018 SLA, all legis.) 
(“[The offense is a Class C felony if] the value of the property, adjusted for inflation as 
provided in AS 11.46.982, is $250 or more but less than $750 and, within the preceding five 
years, the person has been convicted and sentenced on two or more separate occasions in 
this or another jurisdiction .	.	.	.”). 
 14. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26–27 (1992) (noting this fact and mentioning other 
cases). 
 15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-72(a)–(b)(6) (2017); Andrew Katbi, Note, Crossing the 
Line: An Analysis of Problems with Classifying Recidivist Misdemeanor Offenses as 
Felonies, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 105, 123 (2014) (discussing the use of felony charges on the 
sole basis of prior misdemeanor offenses). 
 16. See Katbi, supra note 15, at 111–13. 
 17. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-72(a) (2017). 
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habitual misdemeanor larceny statute comes with a lot of squeeze: the 
cost to the state of prosecuting and imprisoning more felons, the 
societal costs of creating more felons, and the individual costs to 
offenders with felon status. Punishing petty larceny recidivists as 
felons with slightly longer prison sentences comes with a significant 
cost and negligibly serves the alleged benefits of the law—deterrence 
and prevention. In fact, some research suggests longer prison 
sentences may take minor criminals and turn them into violent 
offenders.18 With the uncertain efficacy and possibly deleterious 
effects of longer sentences in the misdemeanor larceny context, it is 
important to explore other punishment options that are more cost 
effective and avoid the long-term consequences of felon status. 
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the 
“squeeze” created by costs to the state, society, and the individual. 
Part II explores the “juice” the statute seeks to yield by examining the 
deterrence effect of increased punishment for misdemeanor larceny 
recidivists and possible criminogenic effects of longer prison 
sentences for minor offenders. Finally, Part III reaches the conclusion 
that a law with such high costs and so little yield is not worth the 
squeeze to get the juice, but offers possible alternative solutions to 
North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute. 
I.  THE “SQUEEZE”: THE COST OF CREATING MORE FELONS 
Creating more felons comes with fiscal costs, societal costs, and 
individual costs. Of course, the costs of the law depend very heavily 
on the decisions of a key player in the North Carolina criminal justice 
system: the prosecutor. It is the prosecutor who decides what charges 
to seek and what laws to use in administering criminal justice.19 
Indeed, there is research showing that prosecutors are reluctant to use 
newer laws.20 Regardless of this variable’s effect, however, the 
potential costs are great, and the actual costs, when the law is used, 
demand evaluation. The North Carolina General Assembly, however, 
 
 18. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HOW MANY AMERICANS 
ARE UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 21 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/
publication/how-many-americans-are-unnecessarily-incarcerated [https://perma.cc/HRL6-
PFQM]; see also infra Section II.C. 
 19. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 193 N.C. App. 236, 238, 666 S.E.2d 880, 883 (2008) 
(noting that a prosecutor “has discretion” to prosecute a defendant as a habitual felon 
when the defendant has three prior felony convictions). 
 20. See Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1950 
(2014) (“As it turns out, North Carolina has many new laws that are rarely used. In fact, 
data collected by the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts reveal that in 
North Carolina, most new crimes are effectively dead letters from the beginning.”). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 432 (2019) 
2019] HABITUAL MISDEMEANOR LARCENY 437 
seemingly failed to thoroughly conduct this evaluation when it first 
contemplated the habitual misdemeanor larceny statute. 
A. Legislative Genesis: Rushing to Judgment 
Though creating an entirely new group of felons is a significant 
choice, the legislature appears to have made the decision to do so 
without any meaningful consideration of habitual misdemeanor 
larceny’s costs. Scant information exists about the initial impetus to 
pass a habitual misdemeanor larceny statute, but there is evidence 
that it came about at the urging of law enforcement officials. One 
news story cites Henderson, North Carolina, police officers as 
advocating for a recidivist larceny law similar to one that exists in 
Virginia.21 Indeed, it was the Democratic representative for 
Henderson, North Carolina, who introduced and sponsored the 
original version of the bill in the North Carolina House of 
Representatives.22 Police preference for such a law again dominated 
the Senate Judiciary II Committee meeting that discussed the 
proposed habitual misdemeanor larceny provision.23 
The North Carolina General Assembly passed the habitual 
misdemeanor larceny statute during the 2011–2012 legislative 
session.24 At the initial House committee meeting, the only expert 
recorded as having spoken was a representative from the North 
Carolina Retail Merchants Association.25 One committee member, 
Representative Bryant, appears to have discussed “best practices in 
loss control,” but there are no other recorded comments challenging 
the efficacy of greater punishments for misdemeanor larceny 
recidivists.26 At the end of the meeting, the committee opened the 
floor to public comment, but no comments were made.27 A Bill 
 
 21. Beau Minnick, Henderson Police Want Tougher Law for Habitual Thieves, 
WRAL (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/9015971/ [https://perma.cc/
J427-3K2N]. 
 22. An Act to Create the Status Offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Larceny: Hearing on 
H.B. 54 Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. B, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C. 
Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Feb. 23 H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing] (agenda and minutes 
of the Feb. 23, 2011, hearing). 
 23. An Act to Create the Status Offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Larceny: Hearing on 
H.B. 54 Before the S. Judiciary II Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C. May 
22, 2012) [hereinafter May 22 S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing] (minutes and notes of the May 
22, 2012, hearing). 
 24. Act of Dec. 1, 2012, ch. 90, §	1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 737, 738 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §	14-72(b)(6) (2017)). 
 25. See Feb. 23 H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
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substitute was reported favorably out of the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee B at the next meeting on March 9, 2011;28 the version 
reported out of committee originally required seven prior 
misdemeanor larceny convictions before felon status could be 
charged.29 
Following approval in the House, the Senate Judiciary II 
Committee took up discussion of the proposed law.30 Legislative 
research staff attended the hearing to answer questions posed by 
senators, but no opposition to the bill was recorded in the committee 
minutes.31 Other than legislative research staff, the only other outside 
representative to speak was the general counsel for the North 
Carolina Chiefs of Police.32 As he put it, “the police have wanted 
something like this [law] for a long time.”33 Though there were 
representatives from both the North Carolina Advocates for Justice 
and the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts present 
during the hearing, the minutes recorded no comments from the 
general public.34 With apparently limited opposition raised against the 
Bill, the Senate Judiciary II Committee recommended the law be 
amended to reduce the number of predicate offenses to four, meaning 
the fifth offense would bring a defendant under the statute’s habitual 
provision.35 
Thus, a new class of felons was born with only the barest of 
consideration for the costs and virtually no opposition to the law. 
Though the legislature considered financial costs, those costs were 
never expressly justified on any grounds. North Carolina decided it 
needed the squeeze without ever considering what juice it would 
receive. 
B. Financial Costs to the State 
Reading through committee minutes, it does not appear that 
North Carolina’s incipient habitual misdemeanor larceny statute 
 
 28. An Act to Create the Status Offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Larceny: Hearing on 
H.B. 54 Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. B, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C. 
Mar. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Mar. 11 H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing] (agenda and minutes 
of the Mar. 9, 2011, hearing). 
 29. H.B. 54, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.C. 2011) (as proposed by H. Judiciary 
Subcomm. B, Feb. 9, 2011). 
 30. See May 22 S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 23. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.; see also Minnick, supra note 21. 
 34. May 22 S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 23. 
 35. Id. 
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received significant challenges on either policy or empirical grounds. 
There was, however, ample concern about the financial realities of 
such a law,36 especially given the fiscal attitudes dominating the North 
Carolina General Assembly during the 2011–2012 session.37 
Before a defendant becomes a convicted felon, who must be 
housed by the Department of Public Safety, he or she is a criminal 
defendant entitled to legal representation and a fair trial. With the 
passing of the new recidivist statute, the North Carolina 
Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) predicted a significant 
increase in costs to the court system.38 In 2011, the calendar year 
immediately preceding the Bill’s passage, there were 42,160 Class 1 
misdemeanor larceny charges statewide.39 The AOC estimated a full 
24% of those cases (10,118) could have been charged under the new 
law as a Class H felony.40 On average, the cost difference between a 
Class 1 misdemeanor and a Class H felony is $336 per case, meaning 
the difference in the caseload could have cost the court system 
$1,387,344 to $3,399,648 in the first full year of implementation, 
depending on the rate the new law was used by the state.41 In addition 
to these costs for the habitual misdemeanor larceny trial, it was also 
possible that defense attorneys would more vigorously contest the 
predicate fourth misdemeanor larceny charge.42 
Of course, the cost of defending against habitual misdemeanor 
larceny charges was possibly tempered by the reluctance of 
prosecutors to charge individuals with relatively new crimes.43 
Accepting as true the proposition that this reluctance to charge under 
 
 36. The statistics in this section are drawn almost entirely from the final version of the 
Incarceration Note produced by the North Carolina General Assembly Fiscal Research 
Division. See N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY FISCAL RESEARCH DIV., LEGISLATIVE 
INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, H.B. 54, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess., at 5 (2011) 
[hereinafter INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE], https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/
FiscalNotes/House/PDF/HIN0054v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWH8-NU9L]. 
 37. See Minnick, supra note 21 (“Rep. Jim Crawford, D-Granville, said he hopes to 
introduce a bill as early as next week, but lawmakers say funding could be an issue, 
especially in times of a state budget crisis.”). 
 38. INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 2–3 (“This estimate includes 
costs for those positions typically involved in felony cases – Superior Court Judge, 
Assistant District Attorney, Deputy Clerk, Court Reporter, and Victim Witness/Legal 
Assistant – as well as operating and infrastructure costs.”). 
 39. Id. at 3. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2–3. The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission noted 
“that there were 17,197 misdemeanor larceny convictions in FY 2010–11.” Of these, “they 
estimated that 4,129 (24%) have seven or more prior convictions.” Id. at 2. 
 42. Id. at 3. 
 43. See Welty, supra note 20, at 1950–51. 
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new laws renders those laws “dead letters”44 from the beginning, it is 
still true that the threat of such a law hung over every defendant 
eligible to be charged. In the context of misdemeanor recidivist 
statutes such as this one, people charged with minor misdemeanors 
suddenly found themselves facing felony convictions. Such a drastic 
increase in the potential punishment meant defense attorneys, even if 
they did not end up defending against the enhanced charges outright, 
still needed to do extra work to ensure prosecutors did not bring 
those charges. This added workload includes longer, more difficult 
negotiations between defense attorneys and prosecutors as well as a 
more vigorous defense of prior misdemeanor larceny charges as a 
defendant approaches the requisite fifth conviction. Therefore, even 
though prosecutors might not have used the new law as frequently as 
the AOC estimated, it undoubtedly increased the cost of defending 
people in court. 
Any law that increases the number of incarcerated persons adds 
to an already expensive system. The estimated cost for North 
Carolina to operate its prison system for 2018–2019 is around $1.2 
billion,45 or almost 5% of the state’s roughly $23 billion total 
operating budget.46 As another representative study of New York 
shows, prisons are one of that state’s most burdensome 
expenditures.47 Prison expenditures across the United States became 
all the more burdensome as prison populations exploded during the 
late twentieth century.48 During the height of this prisoner boom, new 
prison construction cost taxpayers around the country $6.7 billion.49 
One scholar concluded, “overspending on incarceration is wasteful 
both in terms of lost productivity of inmates and the additional 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See STATE OF N.C. OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET & MGMT., CURRENT 
OPERATIONS APPROPRIATION: PUBLIC SAFETY - ADULT CORRECTION - CANTEEN 
FUND 8 (2017), https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/documents/files/2017-19_Certified_190_
PublicSafety.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZYK8-ZKYV]. This sum was derived by adding prison-
management related costs. 
 46. Highlights of Final Budget by North Carolina Legislature, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (June 21, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/north-carolina/
articles/2017-06-21/highlights-of-final-budget-by-north-carolina-legislature [https://perma.cc/
C3W7-FBV5 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 47. David C. Leven, Curing America’s Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
641, 643 (1993) (“In New York, there has been a 13% annual rate of increase since 1986, 
absorbing much of the growth in state revenues.”). 
 48. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 3. The past decades saw a plateauing, if not a 
very minor decline, in prison populations. Id. at 11 fig.3. 
 49. Leven, supra note 47, at 643. The figure is from prison construction around the 
country in 1989. Id. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 432 (2019) 
2019] HABITUAL MISDEMEANOR LARCENY 441 
burden on taxpayers.”50 A surprisingly high number of nonviolent and 
property crime offenders fill these prisons around the country.51 
Incarceration follows a guilty verdict, meaning the state must 
house, feed, and care for the convicted. The North Carolina 
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”)-Prison Section was less certain 
about the impact the law would have on prison populations.52 Using 
the Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission’s estimated number 
of 4,129 likely new convictions, the DPS-Prison Section provided a 
range of estimates at 5%, 50%, and 100% conviction rates within the 
eligible population.53 At a 5% conviction rate, the state would have to 
provide sixty additional prison beds; at 50%, it would have to provide 
603 additional beds; and at 100%, it would have to provide 1,205 
additional beds.54 Assuming all these beds were in “[m]inimum 
[c]ustody,” the total cost increase to prison expenditures in the lowest 
scenario would be $1,865,460 per year, and at the upper end, it would 
be $37,464,655.55 
Finally, all Class H felons who receive an active prison sentence 
are required to undergo nine months of post-release supervision by 
the Department of Safety’s Community Corrections Section 
(“CCS”).56 Offenders may also receive probation in lieu of active 
sentences spent behind bars. During fiscal year 2010–2011, 62% of all 
 
 50. David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to 
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 969 (2013). 
 51. See, e.g., Leven, supra note 47, at 646 (noting that in the early 1990s, two-thirds of 
New York’s prison population was made up of “property, drug or other nonviolent 
crimes”). More recent studies support the proposition that this trend has not changed very 
much in the new millennium. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 9 fig.2. But see 
INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that a large percentage of 
Class H felons receive “intermediate sentences,” meaning they will spend no time in 
prison). Even though judges can give sentences other than active prison time, the costs for 
those supervised periods of release will not be insignificant. See INCARCERATION FISCAL 
NOTE, supra note 36, at 5. 
 52. See INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 4 (citing, among other 
reasons, an inability to determine if there were more convictions in each case from 
multiple counties and an inability to accurately determine how many people charged with 
Class 1 misdemeanors actually had more than seven prior convictions). The DPS used 
seven predicate convictions rather than four; the early drafts of the bill originally required 
seven previous misdemeanor larceny convictions. See, e.g., H.B. 54, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 
2011 Sess. (N.C. 2011) (as reported by H. Judiciary Subcomm. B, Feb. 9, 2011). 
 53. INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 4. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Cost of Corrections, N.C. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.gov/adult-
corrections/cost-of-corrections [http://perma.cc/DMQ6-4KS4] (listing the cost of 
“[m]inimum [c]ustody” as $31,091 per inmate per year). The totals calculated above 
assume all the newly required beds would be required for the full year. 
 56. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-1368.2(a) (2017); INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra 
note 36, at 5. 
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Class H felony offenders received either an intermediate sentence, 
such as probation,57 or a community punishment, such as house 
arrest.58 These punishments must be supervised by state personnel, 
which comes at a cost of $3.57 per offender, per day.59 Therefore, an 
additional twelve months of intermediate or community punishment 
costs the state $1303 per year.60 At the 5% conviction rate of the 
eligible population, this was estimated to cost the state $169,421 in the 
first year of the law’s implementation; at the 100% rate, it would have 
cost the state $3,395,826.61 
Combining these estimated financial costs, the new law was 
predicted to cost North Carolina taxpayers anywhere between 
$3,422,225 and $44,260,129 during the first year of implementation, 
with the line item for housing more inmates over longer periods as 
the most expensive variable.62 Though the costs represent only a 
fraction of the state’s $1.2 billion prison budget, they are significant 
enough for taxpayers to demand that the benefits justify the costs. 
C. The Cost to Society: Perpetuating Disparate Impacts 
Beyond direct financial costs associated with trying, 
incarcerating, and probating felons, there are third-order effects that 
also create a heavy burden for society.63 One of the most insidious 
effects of increased incarceration is the disproportionate impact the 
trend has on minority populations.64 At the outset, it is important to 
note that this Comment makes no assertion, implicit or otherwise, 
that the passage of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny 
statute was racially motivated. Still, it is a new criminal statute, and its 
disparate impact cannot be ignored. Indeed, so immense has the 
disparity in the impact of criminal law become that the United States 
now imprisons more of its minorities than South Africa did at the 
height of apartheid.65 In Washington, D.C., young, poor African 
 
 57. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-1340.11(6) (2017). 
 58. Id. §	15A-1343(a1); INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5. 
 59. INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 55, 61. 
 63. But see Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 397 n.14 (1997) (“One study concluded that the cost to society of 
not incarcerating a career criminal is approximately $430,000 per year—based on annual 
cost of $25,000 per year for incarceration of a convicted felon, the study surmised that 
society pays $405,000 more than the cost of imprisonment.”). 
 64. Leven, supra note 47, at 644–45. 
 65. MICHELE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 6 (rev. ed. 2012); see also Jon 
Greenberg, Kristof: U.S. Imprisons Blacks at Rates Higher than South Africa During 
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American males have a three-in-four chance of spending some time in 
prison.66 Nationally, one in three young African American males will 
spend time in prison, with the ratio as high as one in two for certain 
large cities.67 Compare this to the fact that, nationally, only one in 
thirty-four adults had some form of criminal record, many without 
any accompanying jail time, at the end of 2011.68 Despite policy 
initiatives and countless studies attempting to remedy the problem, 
“race remains stitched into each and every stage of the criminal 
justice system, so much so that one in three African American males 
and one in six Latino males, compared to one in seventeen white 
males, are expected to spend time in prison at some point in their 
lives.”69 The disparate racial impacts of the criminal justice system 
extend beyond imprisonment. For example, one study explored the 
challenges that African Americans with criminal records face in 
applying for jobs, whether or not employers run a background 
check.70 In another study, researchers found when two “tester” job 
applicants, one African American and one white, applied to jobs with 
identical qualifications and criminal records, the African American 
applicants had a significantly lower success rate.71 
Race is not, however, the only basis upon which one can find 
disparities in the effect of felony convictions.72 Any law comes with 
some level of discretion; when that discretion can err on the side of 
 
Apartheid, PUNDITFACT (Dec. 11, 2014, 5:10 PM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/
statements/2014/dec/11/nicholas-kristof/kristof-us-imprisons-blacks-rates-higher-south-afr/ 
[http://perma.cc/CMW7-2WQB] (“The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that, in 
2010, the incarceration rate for black men in all of the country’s jails and prisons was 4,347 
people per 100,000. .	.	. The incarceration rate in South Africa in 1984 -- the midst of 
apartheid -- was 440 persons imprisoned per 100,000 population. Blacks comprised around 
94 percent of those incarcerated.”). 
 66. ALEXANDER, supra note 65, at 6–7. 
 67. Id. at 9. 
 68. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 963, 964 (2013). 
 69. Id. at 968 (footnote omitted); see also PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-
HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 33 (2009) (noting that going to prison has become a “rite of 
passage” for many young, poor people). 
 70. HARRY J. HOLZER, STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, INST. FOR 
RESEARCH ON POVERTY, WILL EMPLOYERS HIRE FORMER OFFENDERS?: EMPLOYER 
PREFERENCES, BACKGROUND CHECKS, AND THEIR DETERMINANTS 29–31 (2002), 
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp124302.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4GN-JTXY]. 
 71. See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA 
OF MASS INCARCERATION 59, 68–70, 102 (2007). 
 72. See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New 
Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 31–32 (2012) (noting that the common denominator is 
almost always “low-income” among the African American neighborhoods affected by the 
criminal justice system). 
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discrimination, it has traditionally discriminated along both racial and 
economic lines.73 Crime and poverty have become so intertwined that 
“[p]ublic defenders and other criminal justice actors are morphing 
into service providers in response to the tight connection between 
criminalization and their clients’ poverty.”74 It is for this reason that 
some have started to decry the “criminalization of poverty” as the 
state continues to “knit” poverty and criminality even closer 
together.75 
Though no statistics exist for convictions of minorities under 
North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute, it is likely 
that punishment will fall most heavily on minorities and the poor, in 
terms of both the rate of conviction and collateral consequences. 
More felons in society also means more people who are either 
unemployable or only employable at inadequate wages.76 These 
individuals create a strain on society that governments must 
ultimately address through more welfare programs—or more prison 
time. 
D. Felon Status: The Highest Cost, and Not Just to the Individual 
It is the felon status, which follows an offender off prison 
grounds, that comes with the greatest cost.77 Some may find the 
 
 73. See T. Markus Funk, Gun Control in America: A History of Discrimination 
Against the Poor and Minorities, in GUNS IN AMERICA: A READER 390, 390 (Jan E. 
Dizard et al. eds., 1999) (“One undeniable aspect of the history of gun control in the 
United States has been the conception that the poor, especially the non-white poor, 
cannot be trusted with firearms.”); Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2173, 2194 n.118 (2016) (discussing variations in the application of gun control laws); 
Thomas B. McAffee, Setting Us Up for Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Terry v. 
Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609, 612, 625 (2012) (discussing Terry’s impact on the ability of the 
police to discriminate on the basis of race and poverty). 
 74. Norrinda Brown Hayat, Section 8 Is the New N-Word: Policing Integration in the 
Age of Black Mobility, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 79 n.82 (2016) (quoting Alexandra 
Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
445, 446 (2015)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Pinard, supra note 68, at 974; see BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 119 (2007) (“[M]en who have been incarcerated have 
significantly lower wages, employment rates, and annual earnings than those who have 
never been incarcerated.”); see also infra Section I.D. 
 77. Felon status has become such a discriminating burden that some have suggested 
ex-felons should become a suspect class. See Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating 
Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1191–92 (2006). This is because 
[e]x-offenders are not just marginalized, they are also a clear example of repeat 
losers in pluralist politics. Ex-offenders are often legally disenfranchised. In 
addition, legislatures impose collateral consequences of conviction on ex-
offenders. Collateral consequences are statutes and regulations that inhibit ex-
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difficulties individuals face as felons unmoving, since it was the 
individual who committed the felony crime in the first place. It is 
reasonable to argue that those convicted of committing larceny five 
times deserve the harsh penalties that come with felon status. But it is 
hard to argue that someone who commits five petty crimes is 
deserving of a lifelong sentence as a second-class citizen. The 
punishment, in this case, would not appear to fit the crime. 
Felons face many well-documented disadvantages as they try to 
reintegrate into society. In fact, some have argued that it is the 
“prison label” following a former offender that does more harm than 
the actual time spent in prison.78 Criminal records can have long-term 
impacts and follow offenders for years.79 Offenders “constantly 
confront questions about their criminal records on every 
application—from applications for welfare or for a job at a fast food 
restaurant, to a volunteer position at the SPCA, and even a box on 
the application to join a PTA.”80 Finding housing and employment 
become immense challenges.81 The rights to vote, serve on a jury, 
obtain student loans, and receive welfare benefits are also precluded 
by a felony conviction.82 
1.  Housing Problems 
Finding housing is a serious obstacle for a convicted felon. 
Moreover, if an offender is unable to secure housing due to a felony 
record, he is less likely to “move past” his interactions with the 
criminal justice system.83 Indeed, one public housing advocate 
painfully observed that, when it comes to housing, “[n]o one’s in more 
need than ex-offenders.”84 Under current federal law, public housing 
authorities have broad discretion to exclude felons from public 
 
offenders’ productive re-entry into society. These statutes testify to ex-offenders’ 
lack of political organization. Furthermore, both ex-offenders’ legal 
disenfranchisement and their de facto political powerlessness are systemic 
problems. Under current equal protection doctrine, however, ex-offenders receive 
judicial protection from government prejudice in name only.  
Id. at 1191. 
 78. ALEXANDER, supra note 65, at 14. 
 79. Pinard, supra note 68, at 964–67. 
 80. Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied 
Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 552 (2005) (discussing the discretion 
public housing authorities have in judging the criminal records of tenants). 
 81. Pinard, supra note 68, at 966–67. 
 82. Forman, supra note 72, at 28–29. 
 83. Pinard, supra note 68, at 967. 
 84. Carey, supra note 80, at 552. 
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housing.85 North Carolina housing law allows housing authorities to 
summarily evict tenants for “criminal activity that threatens the 
health and safety of others or the peaceful enjoyment of the premises 
by others.”86 Though landlords may evict tenants for any criminal 
activity, a felony conviction is far more likely to yield negative results 
than a misdemeanor conviction. As an example of a felony 
conviction’s potency, one website advising individuals seeking public 
housing assistance lists the following caveat in its guide to obtaining 
public housing: “[A] person with an arrest record, but no conviction, 
has a greater chance of qualifying over someone who has been 
convicted of their offense. Furthermore, felons face much greater 
difficulty in qualifying, especially if it was a violence or drug related 
sentence.”87 Without access to such housing, it is very unlikely a 
felony offender will be able to find other affordable housing. 
2.  Employment Problems 
The housing obstacle is exacerbated by the fact that felons also 
have a more difficult time finding employment. The effect of a 
criminal record on employment opportunities “cannot be 
overstated.”88 It is widely believed that stable employment is the 
primary factor in preventing an offender from recidivating.89 Even if 
an offender does find a job, research indicates that his earnings will be 
15% to 25% lower than they would have otherwise been.90 Felon 
status is often an obstacle to obtaining a professional license.91 For 
 
 85. See 42 U.S.C. §	13661(c) (2012); 24 C.F.R. §	982.553(a)(2)(ii) (2018). Public 
housing agencies may deny applications for public housing if the  
applicant or any member of the applicant’s household is or was, during a 
reasonable time preceding the date when the applicant household would otherwise 
be selected for admission, engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal activity 
or other criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or right 
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises. 
§	13661(c). 
 86. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	157-29(e) (2017). 
 87. How Do I Know if I’m Eligible for the Public Housing Program?, AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING ONLINE, https://affordablehousingonline.com/guide/public-housing/am-I-eligible#
qualify [https://perma.cc/UR4T-34RN] (emphasis added). 
 88. Pinard, supra note 68, at 972. 
 89. Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons’ 
Challenges to Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1597, 1611 (2004). 
 90. Kelly Lyn Mitchell, Reining in Collateral Consequences by Restoring the Effect of 
Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2005). 
 91. See Bruce E. May, Real World Reflection: The Character Component of 
Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment 
Opportunities, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 190–91 (1995). 
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example, ex-felons face the challenge of satisfying the “good 
character” requirements in many jurisdictions.92 Since a surprising 
number of jobs now require licensing, inability to obtain a license is 
yet another significant employment barrier.93 
In 2013, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) estimated that 
over 38,000 statutes attach “collateral consequences” to criminal 
offenses; of these statutes, almost 80% of them relate to 
employment.94 In North Carolina alone, the ABA’s website identifies 
963 provisions attaching civil consequences to criminal offenses, with 
many of the provisions applying only to felony convictions.95 As noted 
above, the difficulty ex-felons face in finding well-paying jobs 
inevitably leads many back to offending yet again.96 
Felons also have a harder time clearing their criminal records 
under clemency and expunction provisions. Some states offer 
“certificate of relief” programs; these programs allow offenders to 
apply for a certificate of rehabilitation, issued by the state, that 
removes many of the statutory barriers standing between offenders 
and benefits and employment.97 The earlier an offender can apply for 
a certificate, the sooner he can obtain it and, hopefully, move past his 
crime.98 Multiple felony convictions have a far more negative impact 
on when an offender can apply for the certificate than do 
misdemeanor convictions.99 These types of remedies can restore rights 
to vote, hold public office, and prevent the loss of licensure.100 North 
Carolina allows ex-felons to apply for a “certificate of relief” that can 
alleviate many of the collateral consequences following felon status.101 
This certificate of relief, however, cannot be granted to a person with 
 
 92. See id. at 200–01. 
 93. Sara Sternberg Greene, A Theory of Poverty: Legal Immobility, WASH. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (noting that the number of occupations requiring a license has 
increased from 4.5% to about 29% since the 1950s). 
 94. Pinard, supra note 68, at 974. 
 95. Search Results from JUSTICE CENTER-THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/C6VL-9JYU (staff-uploaded archive)] 
(listing collateral consequences compiled from the General Statutes of North Carolina, the 
North Carolina Administrative Code, and other state sources).  
 96. Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 
45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 259 (2004) (“The ex-offender population has tended to recidivate due 
in part to an unavailability of economic and social supports. The majority of ex-offenders 
released from prison reoffend.”). 
 97. Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 715, 721–24 (2012). 
 98. Id. at 728. 
 99. Id. at 727. 
 100. Id. at 728, 755. 
 101. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-173.2(a) (2017). 
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prior misdemeanor convictions in addition to the felony from which 
the petitioner seeks relief.102 
3.  Voting Problems 
Finally, felon disenfranchisement affects the outcomes of 
elections, causing a significant impact to society at large and ex-felons 
in particular. Felon disenfranchisement changes electoral outcomes 
by denying a voice to many of its citizens.103 Felon status, as a 
percentage of the voting-age population, has risen from about 1% to 
2.3% as of 2002.104 These are the very people who might have valid 
reasons to vote for politicians who favor creating fewer felons; their 
disenfranchisement presents the possibility of a self-building electoral 
cycle where criminal justice reforms are often ignored.105 
In North Carolina, a person is not allowed to vote if he is 
“adjudged guilty of a felony against this State or the United States, or 
adjudged guilty of a felony in another state .	.	. unless that person shall 
be first restored to the rights of citizenship in the manner prescribed 
by law.”106 By statute, all citizenship rights should be automatically 
returned immediately upon the offender’s discharge from prison, 
though clerical errors and voter confusion undoubtedly hinder the 
statute’s automatic restoration of rights.107 As has been seen in recent 
electoral cycles, errors in transmission occur and sometimes 
erroneously bar past felony offenders from voting.108 Recently, a 
North Carolina district attorney brought indictments against ex-felons 
who voted before clearing probation and parole.109 Though it remains 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Political Consequences of Felon 
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 792 (2002). 
 104. Id. at 782 fig.1. 
 105. See id. at 783 fig.2. 
 106. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	163A-841(a)(2) (2017). 
 107. Id. §	13-1(1). 
 108. The author volunteered during the 2016 election by answering phones for a voting 
rights hotline. Several of the questions fielded that day involved ex-felons being told by 
polling officials that they were unable to vote, even though the voters had completed their 
sentences and probations. As an example of the types of clerical errors that can occur, see 
On Election Day, Stay Away, ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 2018, at 31–32. 
 109. Lynn Bonner, Felony Charges of Illegal Voting Dismissed for Five NC Residents, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/
politics-government/article216584335.html [https://perma.cc/VR3K-QWEP] (noting that 
the charges were dismissed pursuant to Alford pleas to lesser charges). For another 
example of the legally fraught environment facing ex-felon voters, see Travis Fain, Federal 
Subpoenas Demand ‘Tsunami’ of NC Voter Records, WRAL (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.wral.com/federal-subpoenas-demand-tsunami-of-nc-voter-records/17821061/ 
[https://perma.cc/GB6R-DWCX] (stating that the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District 
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to be seen if these acts were honest misunderstandings or intentional 
acts, what is certain is that such news will make ex-felons think twice 
before heading to the polls. 
E. The Sum Total of Creating More Felons 
The creation of more felons costs North Carolina a lot of money, 
a lot of time, and a lot of societal progress. It must be acknowledged 
that any criminal record, whether a dropped charge, misdemeanor, or 
felony, poses problems for offenders.110 These problems are 
compounded by the fact that employers, landlords, and others are 
increasingly able to access all criminal records.111 Although a 
misdemeanor record undoubtedly poses problems, a felony record 
creates still greater obstacles. More felons mean more people who 
cannot find work, cannot find housing, and cannot fully participate in 
society. Though North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny 
statute will only add a percentage to the staggering total, any addition 
to such a burden should come with justifying benefits. 
II.  THE “JUICE”: THE VALUE THE LAW PROVIDES 
One would hope that the costs associated with North Carolina’s 
habitual misdemeanor larceny statute are justified by some 
proportional benefit. Opponents often raise incapacitation arguments 
in support of longer sentences, but these assertions carry less weight 
when discussing lower-level felonies with shorter prison terms. One of 
the primary benefits proponents claim is that such a recidivist statute 
deters future crimes.112 
 
of North Carolina sought a large quantity of voting records to investigate possible illegal 
voting). 
 110. Pinard, supra note 68, at 969. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012) (examining the disproportionate and unexpected high costs 
that come with misdemeanor convictions). Though misdemeanor convictions come with 
baggage, that baggage is heavier with a felony conviction. See supra Section I.D. 
 111. Pinard, supra note 68, at 970; see also Natapoff, supra note 110, at 1325 
(“[C]riminal records are easily accessible to employers .	.	.	.”). 
 112. Indeed, most policymakers focus on deterrence and incapacitation when they craft 
criminal laws. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications 
for Criminal Law & Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42 (2007) (“Perhaps more 
importantly, the engine driving American crime politics is not people’s intuitions of 
justice. On the contrary, it is antidesert crime control theories—most notably deterrence 
and incapacitation—that have had the greatest influence in recent criminal justice 
reforms.”). This Comment will not explore any retributivist arguments for harsher 
sentencing in recidivist crimes. These arguments do exist and are valid points within the 
debate, but they are also difficult to quantify as factors in the balance between cost and 
benefit. For a brief discussion of the retributivist motivations behind longer prison 
sentences for recidivists in the Three Strikes context, see Vitiello, supra note 63, at 425–27 
97 N.C. L. REV. 432 (2019) 
450 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
There are two categories of deterrence that are important when 
discussing longer prison sentences: general and specific. “General 
deterrence is the reduction in crime that occurs due to the expectation 
of punishment; longer sentences yield lower crime rates.”113 Specific 
deterrence, on the other hand, applies only to an individual who has 
already been caught, punished, and released—“[s]pecific deterrence is 
the impact that the experience of incarceration has on subsequent 
offending.”114 Extensive scholarship has focused on the deterrent 
effect of longer prison sentences. After so much research, it appears 
the deterrent effect of longer prison sentences is minimal at best, 
perhaps even nonexistent, and possibly counterproductive.115 
Policies seeking to use harsher punishment to deter crime are 
widespread; one of the best-known, studied, and challenged examples 
is California’s experiment with its “Three Strikes” law. This part will 
begin by examining Three Strikes before taking a closer look at the 
possible general and specific deterrence of longer sentences in the 
larceny context.116 After concluding that the general and specific 
deterrent effects are both minimal when dealing with petty property 
crimes, it will then examine the possible counterproductive effects of 
longer prison sentences, effects commonly classified as 
“criminogenic.” After acknowledging the “benefits” other than the 
 
(concluding, ultimately, that punishments under Three Strikes do not qualify as 
retributivist at all). 
 113. Abrams, supra note 50, at 916. 
 114. Id. at 917. 
 115. See Shawn D. Bushway & Emily G. Owens, Framing Punishment: Incarceration, 
Recommended Sentences, & Recidivism, 56 J.L. & ECON. 301, 305 (2013) (noting that there 
was no “clear consensus” on the measuring of specific deterrence despite the large body of 
academic work on the issue). 
 116. Incapacitation, the removal of a repeat offender from the community, is another 
possible benefit with recidivist statutes. In the context of habitual misdemeanor larceny, 
however, the incapacitation argument is less persuasive since the actual sentence length 
may vary. See Welty, supra note 20, at 1950 (discussing prosecutors’ reluctance to use new 
laws to their full extent); see also State v. Brice, 247 N.C. App. 766, 768, 786 S.E.2d 812, 
814 (2016) (discussing the sentence for a habitual misdemeanor larceny offender that was 
suspended for all but seventy-five days), rev’d on other grounds, 370 N.C. 244, 806 S.E.2d 
32 (2017). The result in Brice is not an uncommon outcome for those charged with 
habitual misdemeanor larceny. With such relatively short prison sentences, incapacitation 
can only bring so much benefit. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, No. COA17-971, 2018 N.C. 
App. LEXIS 272, at *1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018) (discussing a 100-day active 
sentence). But see State v. Glidewell, __ N.C. App. __, __, 804 S.E.2d 228, 231 (2017) 
(affirming the trial court’s imposition of an eleven to twenty-three months active 
sentence). As Glidewell indicates, some trial courts are willing to impose felony-length 
prison sentences. Still, even if the defendant in Glidewell served the maximum amount of 
time (an unlikely prospect), the amount of time he would be removed from the 
community would still not be that great when compared to other, more serious felonies. 
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deterrence of future crime, this part ultimately concludes that longer 
prison sentences come with few benefits at best; at worst, more prison 
time actually creates more problems. 
A. Did Three Strikes Deter Crime? 
North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute came 
into existence without a clear underlying basis for the increase in 
punishment for repeat larcenists.117 Nonetheless, a possible 
justification for the law is a general notion that harsher punishment 
for repeated offenses deters crime. A famous example is California’s 
recidivist Three Strikes law. Though politically popular when enacted, 
the law’s effectiveness in deterring crime is questionable.118 More 
importantly, Three Strikes was not crime-specific, and, therefore, it 
should have little bearing on the potential of North Carolina’s 
habitual misdemeanor larceny statute. In short, proponents of North 
Carolina’s statute should not look to California’s Three Strikes 
statute for its justification. 
In March of 1994, California passed its Three Strikes law,119 
which required “25-years-to-life sentences for offenders with two 
prior serious or violent felony convictions who are convicted of a 
third felony, whether or not the third felony is serious or violent.”120 
In the first year under Three Strikes, California’s crime rate fell 4.9%, 
while the national average dropped only 2%; in the first six months of 
the second year under Three Strikes, the crime rate in California fell 
even faster at 7% as compared to 1% for the rest of the nation.121 At a 
quick glance, it appears that Three Strikes was effective in reducing 
crime. 
Notably, however, California’s crime rates had started to fall 
several years before the enactment of Three Strikes.122 Even though 
California’s crime rates fell faster than many other states, this decline 
was consistent with the broader national decline in violent crime 
 
 117. See supra Section I.A. 
 118. See Vitiello, supra note 63, at 409–12. 
 119. Act of Mar. 7, 1994, ch. 12, §	1(a)(1), 1994 Cal. Stat. 71, 72 (codified as amended at 
CAL. PENAL CODE §	667 (West 2018)) (“[A]ny person convicted of a serious felony who 
previously has been convicted of a serious felony .	.	. shall receive, in addition to the 
sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each 
such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately.”). 
 120. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did “Three Strikes” Cause the Recent Drop 
in California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General’s Report, 32 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 101, 101 (1998). 
 121. Vitiello, supra note 63, at 441. 
 122. Beres & Griffith, supra note 120, at 107. 
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among urban youth populations, who were not likely to be implicated 
by Three Strikes due to their youth and relatively limited criminal 
record.123 Indeed, cities where this demographic was heavily 
concentrated dropped at rates similar to those in other large cities, 
which was possibly attributable to a good economy rather than 
harsher criminal sentencing laws.124 This makes sense because 
California’s economy started to boom around the same time as the 
enactment of Three Strikes, with crime rates falling and rising in 
unison with unemployment.125 Thus, it would be misleading to rely on 
Three Strikes for support of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor 
larceny statute without considering economic trends. 
Reliance on Three Strikes becomes increasingly problematic 
when examining its effect on property crime rates. Like violent 
felonies, crime rates for theft fell by greater percentages among young 
groups than it did among older groups.126 However, violent crime 
rates decreased more than nonviolent crime rates.127 This statistic is 
particularly suspect considering Three Strikes punishment should 
deter crimes that originally imposed shorter prison sentences. Other 
studies praising Three Strikes in some contexts still found that second 
and third strike deterrence of larceny was not only nonexistent but 
larceny rates actually “significantly” increased by 17,700 cases.128 One 
possible explanation for this increase in larceny is its attractiveness as 
a “nonstrikeable offense,”129 but such an explanation imputes a level 
of rationality to criminal acts that other research does not support.130 
Whatever the reason, it seems clear that larceny was not deterred 
under California’s Three Strikes law.131 
 
 123. Id. at 127. 
 124. Id. at 118, 127–29. The three most violent cities were located in states with two- or 
three-strike laws. See Vitiello, supra note 63, at 441 n.263. 
 125. Beres & Griffith, supra note 120, at 127–29. 
 126. Id. at 121–22. Though theft did not qualify as a “strikeable” offense, the penalty 
for subsequent theft can still be greatly enhanced by the Three Strikes law. Still, theft rates 
among younger offenders also declined at rates higher than those of older offenders. Id. 
 127. Id. at 122. 
 128. Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of 
California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159 (2002). “For 
rape, larceny, and auto theft, the coefficients on the two-strikes sentencing variable are 
positive but insignificant. The impact of three-strikes sentences on murder, robbery, and 
burglary is negative and significant. In contrast, the impact of three-strikes sentences on 
larceny is positive and significant.” Id. at 185. 
 129. Id. at 175. 
 130. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 36–37 (discussing whether knowledge of possible 
prison sentences deters crime). 
 131. See Shepherd, supra note 128, at 190. 
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California’s Three Strikes is limited, at best, in predicting the 
effectiveness of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny 
statute. First, crime rates among younger persons declined at the 
greatest rates. Unemployment was also falling during Three Strikes’ 
initial years, something that likely affected, if it did not in fact cause, 
the drop in crime rates. Second, as California’s crime rates fell, so did 
the rest of the nation’s, though at generally lower rates. Finally, Three 
Strikes did not appear to deter larceny and other “nonstrikeable” 
offenses, that is offenses that did not qualify as “strikes.” This fact 
alone makes the study of Three Strikes admittedly limited in its 
assessment of longer prison sentences’ effect on larceny. 
B. The Deterrent Effect of Felony Punishment on Misdemeanor and 
Property Crimes 
One of the most interesting findings of Three Strikes research is 
the law’s limited effect on property crimes. As one author 
hypothesized, this might have been due to the appeal of crimes that 
did not fall within the law’s purview.132 But it is also possible that 
property crimes and misdemeanors are different, and that the 
deterrent effect of a longer punishment varies among different 
crimes.133 Not all crimes are created equal; what deters a murderer 
may not deter a shoplifter.134 Perhaps because of these differences, 
laws that seek to deter larceny have faced sharp skepticism from legal 
scholars.135 
 
 132. See id. 
 133. See George Antunes & A. Lee Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: 
Some Implications for Criminal Justice Policy, 51 J. URB. L. 145, 153 n.23 (1973). Antunes 
and Hunt compared their findings to an earlier study. The research sought to examine the 
effect of the severity of punishment with the certainty of punishment. Antunes and Hunt 
found that larceny was negatively impacted (that is, there was a reduction in crime rates) 
by certainty of punishment, but the severity of punishment had such a slight effect as to 
not merit classification as “negative.” Of all the variables researched, the severity of the 
punishment was found to be the weakest predictor of crime reduction. Id. at 154. 
 134. Xiaogang Deng, The Deterrent Effects of Initial Sanction on First-Time 
Apprehended Shoplifters, 41 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 284, 
285 (1997). But see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A 
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 173–74 (2004) 
(arguing that changes to existing criminal laws to allocate greater criminal liability have no 
deterrence effect whatsoever). 
 135. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 431 (1974) (“[The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule] is not 
supposed to ‘deter’ in the fashion of the law of larceny, for example, by threatening 
punishment to him who steals a television set—a theory of deterrence, by the way, whose 
lack of empirical justification makes the exclusionary rule look as solid by comparison as 
the law of gravity.”). 
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North Carolina passed its habitual misdemeanor larceny statute 
in 2011, and the law took effect in 2012. A review of larceny rates in 
the state shows steady declines in the rate of larceny from 2013 to 
2016.136 Larceny rates had already been falling, however, at 
comparable rates prior to the law’s passage, with the largest drop in 
the past ten years coming in the period between 2008 and 2009.137 
Moreover, the deterrent effect on the specific types of larceny 
covered by the misdemeanor recidivist statute is questionable. 
Shoplifting, a crime that often involves amounts below $1000, is a 
good example. In the year immediately after passage of the law, 2012 
to 2013, the rate of shoplifting actually increased, as did the value of 
goods stolen through shoplifting.138 From 2013 to 2014, the number of 
shoplifting cases then decreased slightly.139 Though statistics can be 
interpreted in many ways, one conclusion is inescapable: larceny 
statistics do not support a causal connection between the passage of a 
habitual misdemeanor larceny statute and a decrease in larceny rates. 
The ineffectiveness of longer sentences for petty crimes of 
larceny is not a surprising result given the probable ineffectiveness of 
longer sentences as a solution to property crime. Since longer 
sentences are both expensive and, at best, mildly effective at deterring 
petty property crime, a cost-benefit analysis reveals that incarceration 
for minor property crimes is inefficient. As one researcher explained, 
“[s]imply put, incarcerating someone for stealing a $1000 laptop is not 
very cost-effective.”140 The same researcher thus recommended policy 
changes that use other means to attempt to punish and deter such 
crimes.141 Such an approach comports with other findings that indicate 
the almost total absence of deterrent effect from tweaking criminal 
sanctions within existing laws.142 
 
 136. N.C. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA - 2016, 
tbl.9 (2017), http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx [https://perma.cc/5UK2-9MHZ 
(staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 137. Id. 
 138. N.C. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LARCENY BY STOLEN VALUE AND 
DISTRIBUTION: 2012–2013 (2014), http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/C2CV-HT5Q (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 139. N.C. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LARCENY BY STOLEN VALUE AND 
DISTRIBUTION: 2013–2014 (2015), http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9NFY-WVDY (staff-uploaded archive)].  
 140. Abrams, supra note 50, at 966. 
 141. See id. (exploring the idea of reclassifying crimes and noting that California has 
already made such changes with positive initial results). 
 142. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 
951 (2003) (“The general existence of the system may well deter prohibited conduct, but 
the formulation of criminal law rules within the system, according to a deterrence-
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Maybe what matters more in the context of misdemeanors (and 
probably felonies too) is the likelihood of getting caught, not the 
length of the punishment.143 Larger police forces and misdemeanor 
arrests likely deter larceny not because of incapacitation, since jail 
time in such situations is negligible,144 but because the chance of 
apprehension is all the more likely. Though deterrence is difficult to 
analyze, research does tend to promote the idea that certainty of 
punishment is more important than its severity.145 For example, one 
study focused on the punishment of probationers who violated the 
terms of their probation.146 The research compared two enforcement 
practices. The first was the practice of allowing the probationer to 
commit multiple violations before sending the offender back to 
prison. The second was the use of “swift and certain” punishment by 
probation officers, even if the punishment did not include immediate 
revocation of the offender’s probation.147 Researchers found that the 
use of “swift and certain” enforcement was far more effective than 
“the threat of more severe punishment occurring at some point in the 
future.”148 Similarly, another important component that is often 
overlooked is the length of time it takes for the punishment to 
arrive.149 Because felony trials take longer than misdemeanor trials 
and include juries, delaying punishment may serve to dilute the threat 
of an increased sentence. 
Since it is likely that certainty matters more than the severity, 
larceny is a crime where the use of longer sentences is even less likely 
to matter. Larceny’s close counterpart, shoplifting, is notoriously 
underreported and difficult to enforce, meaning the greater certainty 
 
optimizing analysis, may have a limited effect or even no effect beyond what the system’s 
broad deterrent warning has already achieved.”). 
 143. See Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. & 
ECON. 235, 262 (2005) (noting that the size of the police force had an effect only on the 
crimes of motor vehicle theft and grand larceny and that misdemeanor arrests also had a 
deterrent effect on grand larceny); see also Deng, supra note 134, at 285 (noting that the 
embarrassing, public nature of an arrest following a shoplifter’s first time getting caught is 
one of the best ways to prevent shoplifting recidivism). 
 144. Corman & Mocan, supra note 143, at 251. 
 145. Vitiello, supra note 63, at 441. This argument was made 200 years ago by early 
criminal scholar Cesare Beccaria. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 58 
(Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1764). 
 146. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 35 (examining “inmates ‘scores’ that determined 
parole eligibility based on risk of recidivism”). 
 147. Id. at 37. 
 148. Id.; see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 134, at 174. 
 149. Robinson & Darley, supra note 134, at 193 (“[F]inding that the effects of 
punishment in deterring behaviour drop off rapidly as the delay increases between the 
transgressive response and the administration of punishment for that response.”). 
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is that punishment will not occur.150 As for larceny itself, in one 
Department of Justice study from the mid-1980s, larceny was listed as 
one of the most underreported crimes.151 If a crime is not reported, it 
is not likely to be punished. If it is not likely to be punished, 
mandating a longer prison sentence for when it is occasionally 
punished cannot do much good. 
Not only is punishment less certain because the crime is 
underreported, it is also less certain because offenders may not have 
adequate notice about the new law. The offender who consistently 
commits misdemeanor larceny knows his behavior is illegal, but that 
does not mean he knows his behavior becomes “more illegal” on the 
fifth conviction.152 This raises another important question: how can 
the law deter if the offender does not know his behavior faces more 
severe sanction? Whatever advantages a larceny “frequent flyer” may 
have in the realm of notice, “the most that can be said is that many 
North Carolina residents may be ignorant of much of the state’s 
criminal law, and that a simpler and more compact criminal code 
might be easier to remember and to follow.”153 A study by North 
Carolina economist David Anderson would seem to confirm this 
sentiment. After conducting interviews with inmates, Anderson found 
 
 150. See Michael Corkery, They’re Falsely Accused of Shoplifting, but Retailers 
Demand Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/
business/falsely-accused-of-shoplifting-but-retailers-demand-they-pay.html [https://perma.cc/
77YJ-MRAN (dark archive)] (“Shoplifting is an intractable problem for retailers, costing 
stores more than $17 billion a year, according to an industry estimate.”). Though a distinct 
crime, acts of shoplifting can usually be charged as acts of larceny, meaning the pervasive 
nature of shoplifting is, in actuality, the pervasive nature of larceny. Compare N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §	14-72 (2017) (“Larceny of property; receiving stolen goods or possessing stolen 
goods.”), with id. §	14-72.1 (“Concealment of merchandise in mercantile establishments.”). 
One of the cases with which the author assisted involved an act of “larceny” from a major 
retailer, a crime that could have easily been punished as shoplifting. 
 151. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE 1 (1985), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/rcp.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9PS-MNSJ] (noting that larceny was one of the most 
underreported crimes in 1983).  
 152. See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1553 (2005) (“Universal ignorance of the law, however, appears 
to be almost complete, except for the most rudimentary notions of what is illegal and hazy 
ideas about what some of the details might be. In a recent study of educated citizens in 
four different states, the results confirmed the hypothesis that ‘people do not have a clue 
about what the laws of their states hold on .	.	. important legal issues.’”). Of course, a 
repeat larceny offender would have the added advantage of being warned by counsel or 
the judge at his previous trials that a more severe charge awaited him after his fifth 
offense, but there is nothing to say that a judge or lawyer must so inform a defendant. 
 153. Welty, supra note 20, at 1959; see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 134, at 176–
77 (noting that even those who offend, and thus have the greatest motive to know the law, 
rarely understand or comprehend the law’s consequences). 
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“that only 22 percent knew beforehand what the punishment would 
be for their crime while more than half did not know or even consider 
the punishment.”154 As Anderson’s findings suggest, even knowledge 
that greater penalties await future offense does not mean the 
offenders will change their behavior.155 Ignorance of the law is, of 
course, no excuse, but policymakers would do well to consider this 
ignorance when adjusting the criminal code.  
C. The Possible Backlash of Longer Sentences 
As the previous section shows, even if severe punishment does 
eventually arrive, it is not clear whether it does a very good job of 
deterring future criminal behavior. One Justice Department study 
found that prison stays between six and thirty months had no effect 
on recidivism.156 Another study found that, among juveniles, prison 
sentences ranging from three to thirteen months did not affect re-
arrest rates.157 In addition to these ambiguous results, longer prison 
sentences for relatively low-level offenders can actually increase 
criminality. 
A long stay in prison for misdemeanor property crimes may have 
no deterrent effect on the prisoner at all. As it turns out, prison may 
actually increase the likelihood that larceny offenders recidivate upon 
release.158 While short prison sentences have been shown to provide 
specific deterrence, prison sentences over twelve months have been 
shown to increase the likelihood of recidivism.159 Another study found 
that each additional month of time up to twenty months deterred 
future criminal conduct, but beyond twenty months the effect was 
negligible.160  
A possible part of the explanation for this increased recidivism 
rate is an inmate’s “criminal capital formation.”161 This is the 
development of criminal skills that makes an inmate a more effective 
criminal upon release.162 Since this potential “criminogenic” effect is 
more potent for lower-level offenders, the larceny offender may do 
 
 154. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 36–37. 
 155. Id. at 37 (citing a study that found minor offenders who were about to turn 
eighteen still planned on committing the same number and type of crimes after they 
became legal adults and would be subject to harsher sanctions). 
 156. Id. at 36. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 35. 
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 162. Id. 
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more than steal when he leaves prison: he may move on to more 
serious, violent offenses.163 
D. Are There Benefits Other than Deterrence? 
Though this Comment weighs deterrence as a justification for 
longer prison sentences, there are other arguments to be made in 
support of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute. 
Retributivists may argue that someone who steals five times, no 
matter the value of the property stolen, simply deserves punishment 
as a felon. While this sentiment is a politically acceptable reason to 
implement a new law, it seems that whatever societal catharsis is 
gained through the law still comes at too high a cost. 
Others may argue that incapacitation of recidivists also makes 
the law worthwhile. But an incapacitation argument falters on three 
grounds. First, habitual misdemeanor larceny is unlikely to result in 
lengthy prison sentences.164 This means that those charged with 
habitual misdemeanor larceny will not be off the streets for very long. 
Second, the incapacitation still comes at a great cost to the state,165 
one that should be required to show results in the form of reduced 
property crime commensurate or greater than the amount of money 
spent incapacitating repeat offenders. Given the cost of implementing 
the law, these justifying benefits seem unlikely to materialize. Third, 
locking up older, more experienced offenders may not be the best use 
of the state’s prison resources.166 It is younger offenders who pose the 
greatest risk to society.167 But it is the older, more experienced 
offender who gets the longer sentence, taking up jail resources long 
after he has “aged out of crime.”168 Both retributivist and 
incapacitation arguments in favor of North Carolina’s habitual 
misdemeanor larceny statute are valid, but they are not persuasive 
when the meager benefits are weighed against the substantial costs. 
 
 163. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 21–22 (“Once individuals enter prison, they 
are surrounded by other prisoners who have often committed more serious or violent 
offenses.”). 
 164. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 165. See INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5; Cost of Corrections, 
supra note 55. 
 166. See Vitiello, supra note 63, at 443. 
 167. Id. at 442–43. 
 168. Id. at 443; see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 35 (pointing out that as 
criminals get older, they become less likely to commit new offenses); Abrams, supra note 
50, at 916 (“[C]rime is a young-man’s game.”). 
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E. Little, if Any, Juice from a Felony Sentence for Misdemeanor 
Larceny 
Definitive studies on the effect of harsher punishment and 
deterrence are hard to find.169 By examining the broad field of 
literature, however, it is possible to draw a few conclusions. First, the 
deterrent effect, if any, is small,170 especially as it relates to 
misdemeanor larceny. Second, exogenous factors other than sentence 
length play an important role in crime rates and recidivism,171 though 
that role is not perfectly understood. Third, it is very possible that 
longer sentences may increase both the likelihood of recidivism and 
the violence of the subsequent acts committed by misdemeanor 
larceny offenders.172 Finally, any additional “benefits” beyond 
deterrence are also unlikely to justify the cost of creating more felons 
from those accused of misdemeanor property crimes.173 There may be 
some juice, but there is not much. Quite simply, any benefit is likely 
negated by the criminogenic effects of longer sentences. 
III.  ALTERNATIVES TO FELON STATUS FOR MISDEMEANOR 
LARCENY OFFENDERS 
Given the dim prospects for deterrence of misdemeanor larceny 
through the use of felony convictions and sentences, it is worth 
exploring other options that could both prevent future offenses and 
make victims of larceny whole. Not only are these options potentially 
more effective but they are also cheaper in terms of dollars and 
societal costs. 
One positive aspect of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor 
larceny statute is that judges have some discretion in determining the 
offender’s sentence, though there may still be mandatory minimums 
 
 169. Vitiello, supra note 63, at 441 (“Deterrence arguments are notoriously difficult to 
assess, in large part because society is not set up to allow carefully controlled 
experiments.”). 
 170. The most sanguine assessment the author found concluded the following:  
[A]nalyses generally agree that increased incarceration rates have some effect on 
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incarceration is associated with a 2 to 4 percent drop in crime. Moreover, analysts 
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will prevent considerably fewer, if any, crimes .	.	.	. 
Don Stemen, Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for Reducing Crime, 19 FED. 
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 173. See supra Section II.D. 
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based on the offender’s previous criminal record.174 For example, 
assume an offender being tried under the habitual misdemeanor 
larceny statute has only his four prior larceny convictions. Each of 
these convictions is a Class 1 misdemeanor,175 each worth one point. 
With four points, this offender is a “level II” offender.176 A level II 
offender charged with a Class H felony has a presumptive minimum 
sentence of six to eight months, a sentence that can be served as an 
intermediate sentence or wholly active.177 “Intermediate punishment 
is supervised probation plus at least one of six specific conditions of 
probation (special probation, residential program, electronic house 
arrest, intensive supervision, day reporting center, and drug treatment 
court).”178 As of 2011, 44% of all felony sentences were intermediate, 
with intensive supervision and special probation serving as the 
preferred conditions.179 For some reason, however, habitual 
misdemeanor larceny offenders appear to be given active sentences 
far more often than intermediate sentences.180 
The sentence length can also be reduced to four to six months if 
mitigating factors can be shown.181 To get into this mitigated range, 
however, the offender must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a mitigating factor exists; ultimately, the decision to 
move a sentence into a mitigated range is at the discretion of the 
court. In 2016, it only happened a quarter of the time.182 Though some 
discretion does exist, there is still a good chance that a defendant is 
going to spend some amount of time behind bars. More important 
than the existence or length of the prison sentence, however, is the 
 
 174. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-72(a) (2017); id. §	15A-1340.14(b)(5) (requiring that 
each previous Class 1 misdemeanor count as one point towards criminal history points); id. 
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“felon” label that follows the offender after they leave prison; the 
judge has no power over that label.183 
If a punishment must be enforced, it might be better to use 
probation and community service alternatives to prison.184 A study 
found that such measures were more effective than prison in 
preventing recidivism, especially for property crimes.185 Probation 
supervision costs the state $3.57 per day per offender, as opposed to 
the minimum incarceration cost of $85.18 per inmate per day, 
meaning the more effective remedy is also the more cost-friendly 
option.186 These programs are especially effective if used early in an 
offender’s career; at that age, the “dollar-for-dollar” return is much 
higher than longer incarceration periods.187 Indeed, one study found 
that a “Shoplifter School” helped dramatically reduce the chance 
first-time shoplifters would recidivate.188 
Paying restitution directly to the harmed party is another 
effective way to remedy wrongs and prevent recidivism.189 Such an 
approach helps to shift “the paradigm” of criminal punishment from 
one of the offender against the state to one of the offender against the 
victim.190 Such a paradigm shift “would emphasize the future” rather 
than focus on the past, giving victims a greater voice and a chance to 
come to terms with an uncomfortable past experience.191 These 
programs have taken the form of a mediation exercise between the 
offender and the victim and reached success rates as high as 95% 
 
 183. See supra Section I.D. 
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resolution, a success rate that includes the resolution of non-violent 
crimes.192 
A final option includes the expansion of expungement for ex-
felons. Expunction is not a perfect solution; though a person’s record 
may be cleared, it is also never perfectly cleared.193 The North 
Carolina Justice Center describes expunctions this way: 
In North Carolina, an expunction is the destruction of a 
criminal record by court order. An expunction (also called an 
“expungement”) of a criminal record restores the individual, in 
the view of the law, to the status he or she occupied before the 
criminal record existed. With rare exception, when an 
individual is granted an expunction, he or she may truthfully 
and without committing perjury or false statement deny or 
refuse to acknowledge that the criminal incident occurred.194 
North Carolina’s expunction laws allow the expunction of a Class 
H felony conviction; however, each relevant provision requires that 
the petitioner not have any prior misdemeanor or felony charges.195 
Since habitual misdemeanor larceny requires all four previous 
misdemeanors, the expunction laws are no help to convicted habitual 
offenders. Even if these laws could be applied to habitual 
misdemeanor larceny, the waiting period of ten years under section 
15A-145.5(c)196 would still leave the offender exposed to the 
hardships of ex-felon status as it pertains to housing, employment, 
and other recidivism-preventing factors. Unless the expunction law 
were to be changed to permit expunction of recidivist statutes (a 
scenario that seems highly unlikely),197 however, this point is moot. 
 
 192. Id. at 652–53. 
 193. See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for 
Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1471, 1520–21 (“In sum, expunction is an example of ‘legislative and judicial bodies 
finding compelling policy reasons for ignoring in law what has occurred in fact .	.	.	.’” 
(quoting Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1243 (1976))). 
 194. C. DANIEL BOWES, N.C. JUSTICE CTR., SUMMARY OF NORTH CAROLINA 
EXPUNCTIONS 2017 1 (2017), https://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default/files/Summary%
20of%20NC%20Expunctions%202017_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/87BD-N9PJ]. 
 195. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	15A-145.4(c), -145.5(c) (2017). 
 196. Id. §	15A-145.5(a)–(c). 
 197. See Resnik, supra note 193, at 1520 (“At other times, expunction is predicated on 
a desire to protect an individual from suffering the consequences of government 
misconduct. Expunction is sometimes an artifact of commitment to rehabilitation, and 
when interest in that goal of the criminal justice system wanes, so does legislative 
authorization of expunction.”). Since a recidivist is viewed as a recurring problem by the 
legislature, it is unlikely there would be much motivation to expand expunction laws for 
their benefit. 
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For those charged with habitual misdemeanor larceny, it is the 
felon label that poses the greatest threat to their long-term recovery 
and well-being.198 Since prison sentences are light compared to other 
felonies, especially in practice, solutions that avoid the greatest costs 
will include removing the felon label at the outset or providing for its 
removal through expunction or certificate of relief programs. 
CONCLUSION 
In its habitual misdemeanor larceny statute, North Carolina’s 
legislature created a law with a lot of squeeze and little juice. Because 
of the high costs to both the state and defendants, it is reasonable to 
demand that the law yield notable, positive results. Longer sentences 
have, at best, a negligible impact on misdemeanor larceny rates; at 
worst, a longer sentence may actually increase the likelihood of 
recidivism. These results come with a high price tag in terms of 
dollars, societal burdens, and individual prosperity. Alternatives such 
as the use of probation and community education programs, 
mediation and restitution options, and broadened expungement 
opportunities all are likely more effective, cost less, and provide more 
positive results. Still, the highest costs are tied to the felon label that 
follows repeat petty offenders. Probationary programs will not 
remove this felon label, meaning the state should seriously consider 
whether such a punishment is appropriate for those guilty of minor 
crimes. With such high costs related to imposing longer sentences and 
creating more felons, North Carolina should seriously consider 
replacing its habitual misdemeanor larceny statute with one or more 
of these alternative measures. If North Carolina does, then it may be 
able to get a lot more juice with a lot less squeeze. 
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